M410 

Deleuze and horizontality of thought  

From John Lechte, 50 Key Contemporary Thinkers. From Structuralism to Postmodernity, London and New York: Routledge,1994. Page 101, ‘Gilles Deleuze’.

According to John Lechte in 50 key contemporary thinkers,Deleuze has argued in his thesis Difference and Repetition that 'the play of repetition and difference has supplanted that of the same and representation' in the contemporary era.[i]  My understanding of this 'same and representation' translates as: the categorisation of concepts into groups of 'sameness', firming boundaries and identities, and 'representing' them as such by whatever cultural means.   My understanding of 'repetition and difference' is that repetition endlessly occurs, but that each repeated instance is understood as different.  Relating these concepts to my own art practise, this description of Deleuze’s difficult, dense and extensive works is like finding a gem in a bed of river stones.

Lechte writes that repetition and difference are indicators 'of a move towards non-representational, and radically horizontal, thought' of which Deleuze himself is a practitioner.  'Radically horizontal thought' operates outside the discourse, the thinker separating him or herself from its history and canon, occupying the margins, where the thought explores its own norms and concepts exactly where it cannot be defined.  Horizontal thought is therefore difficult to compare to other thought forms.  It has nothing to do with equality or democracy and does not lead to sameness.  On the contrary, vertical thought leads to sameness, by creating hierarchies and forcing compliance of thoughts and attitudes within them.  Radical horizontality creates a proliferation of multiple differences, and what Lechte describes as 'the instability of difference', where viewpoints constantly shift and boundaries disintegrate.  Radically horizontal thought simply bypasses the verticality of bureaucratic hierarchies, of compliance, and agreed identities.

Lechte argues that Deleuze, for all his resistance to the canon or history of philosophy, nevertheless expands on Nietzsche, who considered subjectivity to be all there is for us, with no distinction possible between object and subject, and no objective truth, only subjective values.  The concept of 'objective truths' implies a vertical hierarchy, or values attached to objects, where the 'truth' of a concept is separate to the reality (or essence) to which it refers.  Horizontality implies a lack of divisions of this type.  Subjective values - or differences - is the only world that exists. [ii]

Lechte writes that 'Horizontality of thought', where objective truth does not exist and there are only subjective values or differences, opens the possibility of thought being creative, 'as a form of poetry, perhaps'.  Deleuze has considered the issue of individual style, and the indivisibility of philosophical styles from the ideas of which style is a part.  He has noted that it is not possible to separate a philosopher’s style from his/her philosophy, as style is practice, and there is no philosopher over and above his/her practice 'as there is no actor separate from his acts, or any cause separate from the effects'.[iii]  I would add that similarly there is no artist separate from his/her artistic output. The work is the performance of the 'being' of the artist, as Paul Crowther/ Merleau-Ponty have commented elsewhere.[iv]  Lechte also writes that the horizontal axis is always in movement - just as Paul Crowther tells us that consciousness never rests and there is always 'more' of the world, because it/we are in a process of constant change. [v] Lechte writes that for Deleuze 'expression is rather a way of being and acting in the world', while morality is 'an ethics of joy' which enhances the power of acting. [vi]  I would prefer the concept of an 'Internal relationship' with one’s work rather than the psychological concept of 'expression', but otherwise very much appreciate the aesthetic of the concepts. 

Continuing with the concept of horizontality of thought, and subjective values or 'differences' not as representations of something else but as reality themselves, Lechte discusses Deleuze’s comments pertaining to signs.  'Signs' are no longer representations of something else; of some object, meaning or truth.  Signs, Lechte explains, are linked to essences, from which we learn and which are 'singular qualities' in themselves, which are understood through differences rather than unity.[vii]  This follows a similar theme to that of Paul Crowther, who in writing of the unified sensory field commented that there is, phenomenologically speaking, no division of experience possible, because to do so makes it another experience.[viii]

Deleuze and Guattari invented a number of terms to redefine human beings, which are helpful in breaking apart established mental models, though difficult to grasp since in their own writings one must become acquainted with the terms through familiarity, rather than explicit 'representation' of them in the existing order. Their writing style is performative of theories discussed, as per the earlier discussions on style. Lechte does explicitly describe them however.  The 'body without organs' he says, refers to the social body, and 'is always in the process of formation and deformation'.  'Desiring machines' refers to a social desire.  These terms modify Freud’s theories and oppose his hierarchical description of the Oedipus complex, where identity is formed though a process of loss and repression, and neuroses result from faults in the process.[ix]   Desire for Deleuze is not related to lack, but is a positive, life affirming and productive energy of flows and lines of flight.   Desire is socially constructed and its form is in constant flux.  The Oedipal father principal is seen as fascistic and repressive, whereas the Nietzschean 'yes' of Deleuze’s desiring machines and body without organs of the social group is seen as a search for freedom, and creative and productive of excess.

As regards my own outlook – three thoughts: 

Lechte finishes this exuberant and informative chapter with a negative note, which perhaps I have insufficient knowledge to contradict, but which seems to me out of place.  He writes that Deleuze is so anxious to erase the negatives of repression that he promotes 'unfettered creativity' to the point where psychoanalysts have wondered if so much creativity might well eliminate war, but instead promote violence. [x]  These concepts may arise from historic connections, and attempts to causally explain WWI as arising out of repression, but it seems somewhat out of place when applied to Deleuze’s horizontality and repetition and difference, these being concepts of quite a different shape.  But deferring to Freudianism - creativity itself does not imply 'instant gratification' or lack of self control.  Only two pages earlier, Lechte himself wrote (quoting Deleuze on Spinoza [xi]) "Expression is rather a way of being and acting in the world, while morality is 'an ethics of joy' which enhances the power of acting." He was not contrasting them against each other, but including them in the same concept.  While admitting that I am thinking from within our existing moral order and not from some new 'unfettered creativity', I do not find it within my 'being' experience to relate 'joy' to violence.  Joy, in my experience, is light and sunny, a sense of childish innocence and freedom, an up-welling of goodwill and connection or unity to everyone and the universe.  Violence on the other hand can be 'glorious', empowering and uplifting, especially as a resolution to earlier frustration or anger, but it is destructive, not goodwill, and is an experience of driving force rather than a playful overflowing.  However, we each have our subjective differences.

At some pre-linguistic level– or perhaps pre-reflective level, I already know of horizontal thought, and difference rather than truth.  It is present in my work.  But to articulate what is there I have needed to study linguistically formed concepts and use these as structural frames on which to reconstruct the studio work in language.  Doing violence to it perhaps, but this is the only way to bring these concepts to consciousness.  To bring them from their pre-linguistic, emotional existence as part of the analogue continuity of being; the undifferentiated smear of emotional experience as understood by the animal, into the world of language where differentiation defines borders and so creates objects - objects of thought, which are subjective.

Considering radical horizontality of thought as unconnected to equality explains aspects of my personal outlook.  Horizontal thought does not equate to anarchist beliefs that there should be no hierarchy of leaders.  I am conscious that part of my own interest in acquiring theoretical knowledge is to improve or consolidate my position in society, and is not merely for the greater good of others (whatever that might be); this cannot be denied.   Knowledge is power and the realisation that my constitutional preference for radically horizontal thought is not the same thing as a totally egalitarian attitude resolves an apparent structural contradiction in my outlook.